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Cultural studies and ‘the popular’
Today cultural studies is regularly credited (or charged) with having challenged and trans-
formed a once-dominant, unreflective concept of ‘mass culture’ which sought to depict popular
cultural forms as politically dangerous or as morally and aesthetically inferior to ‘authentic
culture’ or art. To be sure, contemporary theorists of popular culture are quick to point
out the potentially anti-democratic sentiment expressed by early depictions of so-called
‘mass’ culture as witless and trivial if not, in fact, responsible for many of modern society’s
ills. Indeed, it’s rare to see the views of a Q.D. Leavis, say, or a Theodor Adorno given
much credence anywhere in contemporary cultural studies—or even in literary studies,
where greatest resistance to ‘the popular’ might be most expected. Popular culture would
appear to be no longer subject to the kinds of prejudice that once characterised the elitist
denunciation of anything short of capital-C ‘Culture’ (as ‘the best that has been thought and
said in the world’, for example). This development is undoubtedly owing in part to the
influence in cultural studies of the sophisticated theories of culture enabled by the ‘post-
structuralist turn’ and to the subsequent emphasis on the indeterminacy of meaning and the
multiplicity of uses and interpretations of cultural objects. But it is also enabled by cultural
studies’ democratic challenge to the conservative politics and to the Marxist social theory
that inform Leavis’s and Adorno’s arguments respectively. According to some contem-
porary accounts of culture (and of cultural studies), in fact, the old ‘high/low’ distinction
doesn’t even apply in today’s ‘postmodern’ times, when the boundaries separating such realms
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‘flexible’ that students can study Shakespearean drama alongside hip hop culture. On this
account, ‘the popular’ is no longer a question; it’s a fact of life! The popular is so bound up
with anything we think or do nowadays that it can’t possibly be ignored. It circulates in a
variety of ways, through a diversity of media, and in a heterogeneity of forms, and it’s through
a focus on these differences—of media, of interpretive contexts, of textual histories—that
the study of popular culture has staked its place as one of the leading commentators on
the issues that define our time.
Still, the surety and complacency of this view invite questions about cultural studies’
influence on various practices of cultural assessment. Certainly, questions have been raised
more than once in the history of cultural studies about its ability to transform prevailing con-
cepts and practices of culture. John Hartley, for instance, has questioned the extent to which
cultural studies has popularised its intellectual and critical insights, by noting a ‘continuing
public allegiance’ to ‘the ideology of authenticity’.1 Ultimately, Hartley attributes the relative
impotence, as it were, of cultural studies on this question of cultural authenticity to an intel-
lectual agenda, which has in turn shaped a pedagogical program. The result is ‘a kind of
critical common sense which has created a demarcation line between Cultural Studies and
the aesthetic disciplines (Film and Literary Studies), and further demarcation lines between
popular and other media, between reality and art, truth and fiction’.2 Meanwhile, Ian Hunter
has argued that cultural studies’ historical attachment to a general concept of culture as ‘a
whole way of life’ prevents it from having any impact outside the limited spheres of its
own (inter)disciplinary practices.3 Disconnected from the ‘actual array of historical institu-
tions’ in which human attributes are formed, cultural studies’ favoured concept of culture,
in Hunter’s view, actually inhibits attempts ‘to develop practical forms of cultural analysis
and assessment’, and thus dooms the discipline to political irrelevance.4
Beyond these general critiques of cultural studies’ effectivity, moreover, there are other
signs that the case for the discipline’s success at transforming prevailing concepts of popular
culture may be somewhat overstated. For instance, and notwithstanding the apparent trans-
formation of academic attitudes towards popular culture, Adorno’s and Leavis’s unflattering
views of popular forms strike me as interesting precisely for their similarity to many ‘non-
academic’ assessments of popular texts. How often, in other words, has it been said in spaces
outside the university that such and such a film or book is thoroughly ‘generic’, ‘commercial’,
‘ideological’, ‘frivolous’, ‘lightweight’, etc.? And while popular forms, such as television sit-
coms and action films, are regularly enjoyed and sometimes celebrated by their audiences,
it is not at all unusual to hear both the reviewers and even the viewers of such texts charac-
terise them as second-rate, formulaic, or stereotypical in their portrayal of marginalised
identities. There are, I think, signs—some less citable than others—that the apparent ‘obsol-
escence’ of the ‘high/low’ distinction, and of mass culture discourse more generally, is some-
116 VOLUME13 NUMBER2 SEP2007
csr13-2-08(115-133)  6/28/07  1:45 PM  Page 116
thing of an illusion. We can see it operating in the guilt or embarrassment felt by certain
readers when they are ‘caught out’ reading a Mills & Boon or Harlequin novel. We can see
it especially in the way in which the ‘consumption’ of popular texts is sometimes justified:
in a person’s defense of their decision to see a Schwarzenegger film, say, by claiming that they
felt like watching something that wouldn’t require them ‘to think’. Such sentiments speak
to me of a peculiar contradiction: a kind of concurrent acceptance and condemnation. We
can find in them at best an affirmation of popular narrative via a neutralisation of the
moral dimension to the ‘high/low’ distinction, but with no corresponding transformation of
the aesthetic and hence formal distinction between ‘High Culture’ and plain old everyday
‘popular culture’. To that extent, what might be called a prevailing ‘critical prejudice’ against
popular culture would seem to manifest itself not simply or solely as a particular kind of
(negative) evaluation but more subtly as a specific presumption of popular culture as a fun-
damentally different kind of cultural object to ‘artistic’ forms of culture, one which calls
for a very different kind of response and a very different set of descriptions than is called for
by ‘serious’ cultural texts.
A recent contribution to the study of popular fiction by Ken Gelder proves instructive on
this point. While ‘speak[ing] up for the reputation of popular fiction’, Gelder’s study goes
some way towards demonstrating that certain elements of mass culture theory continue to
delimit and largely define the ways in which people speak about and engage with popular
culture.5 Against the prevailing view that cultural studies’ affirmation of the popular entails
a repudiation of the ‘high/low’ distinction, that is, Gelder delineates the distinct logics inform-
ing engagements with popular fiction and argues that these logics are radically different from
those that order the production and interpretation of ‘Literature’ proper. Thus where ‘a work
of Literature is often thought to have “transcended” genre’, the ‘entire field of popular fiction
is written for, marketed and consumed generically’.6 Similarly, where ‘literary fiction is ambi-
valent at best about its industrial connections … popular fiction generally speaking has no
such reservations’, with its logics of industry and entertainment collectively defining the field
‘quite literally [as] a “culture industry” ’.7 Gelder borrows the latter phrase, of course, from
Adorno and Horkheimer, but against the ‘negative connotations’ invested in the term by
those critics Gelder uses it ‘a little more sympathetically’.8 The term thus becomes a means
for identifying popular fiction as ‘an entire apparatus of production, distribution and con-
sumption’.9 According to Gelder, this apparatus underpins or constitutes a far more diverse
and complex field than Adorno and Horkheimer would admit, but it contrasts nevertheless
with Literature’s proximity to ‘the art world’.10 While Gelder is thus keen to affirm the logics
and practices of popular fiction, adopting a non-reductive and non-dismissive account of
the ‘field’, his comprehensive study nevertheless insists on that field’s distinctiveness, ‘attend-
ing to its various logics and practices and detailing aspects of the way in which it behaves as
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a distinctive but heterogeneous body of writing’.11 Crucially, moreover, Gelder depicts this
distinctiveness as being recognised and propagated not so much by academic commentators
on popular culture as by the producers of popular fiction and, most importantly, by its readers:
Literature deploys a set of logics and practices that are distinctive in kind to those deployed
in the field of popular fiction. Readers, of course, may very well move from the one to the
other, since reading interests can at times be flexible and adaptable. But in doing so, these
different logics and practices are surely registered, which means that Literature and popular
fiction will necessarily not be read or ‘processed’ in the same way.12
The emphasis in this passage on the word ‘necessarily’ is Gelder’s and is testament to the
extent to which existing, concrete practices of popular fiction production and consumption
remain organised by a logic of popular fiction as ‘the opposite of Literature’.13 On the basis
of Gelder’s comprehensive account, in other words, it would seem that—claims to the
contrary notwithstanding—the cultural field remains divided along the lines of something
like the supposedly outdated ‘high/low’ distinction. Thus while Gelder’s study doesn’t directly
speak to the issue, it nevertheless presents some discomfiting questions to orthodox views
of cultural studies’ role and success in transforming prevailing concepts of popular culture.14
In view of such questions, the following discussion seeks to revisit understandings of cul-
tural studies’ relation to putatively outmoded views of popular culture—the better to assess
the possibility of and strategies for transforming prevailing concepts of culture. With an eye,
however, to the potential resistance of mass culture discourse to cultural studies’ counter-
arguments, the analysis turns less on a review of such counter-arguments than on an examin-
ation of some of the discipline’s material points of connection to (or, indeed, disconnection
from) the forms and practices of mass culture critique. Rather than simply accepting the view
that cultural studies has ‘moved on’ from the critical prejudices that may have defined its
pasts, that is, I want to raise the possibility that cultural studies’ intellectual and pedagogical
practice may actually be complicit with the reproduction of a logic of mass culture. In order
to reach that point, the discussion begins in the following section with a reading of two
examples of what I take to be the effects of mass culture discourse. The first of these examples
concerns a brief review of the Clint Eastwood-directed film, Million Dollar Baby (2004)
and shows the shape of this discourse when it takes an aesthetic guise; the second examines
some apparently feminist responses to a jewellery advertisement and follows the same dis-
course in its political form. These two isolated examples are undoubtedly insufficient as
‘evidence’ of cultural studies’ effects on prevailing concepts of popular culture. Taken together,
however, they may (at the least) suggest avenues for re-evaluating the points at which cultural
studies may hope to connect with popular practice—if not (at the most) lending significant
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weight to the view that cultural studies’ attempted transformations of mass culture criticism
have had little effect outside the limited sphere of its own practices of cultural criticism.
The politics of mass culture
As a minimal indication of how the assessment of popular culture may remain organised by
notions of mass culture, consider the following passage from a commentary by Kevin Miller
on Million Dollar Baby (MDB):
‘Some choices you don’t want to make,’ says Scrap, the one-time heavyweight contender
who narrates this film. Unfortunately, his boss, boxing trainer Frankie Dunn, is about to be
presented with a real doozie.
It doesn’t appear that way at first. In fact, had I not been aware of all the controversy sur-
rounding this film, I would have been disappointed that a brilliant director like Clint
Eastwood had devoted his time to what was turning out to be a compelling but not quite
innovative boxing movie. And then, right when the formula calls for a ‘Rocky-like’ charac-
ter to start shouting ‘Adrian! Adrian!’ with his/her eyes swollen shut and arms raised in
victory, Eastwood pulls the old ‘one-two’ and knocks us face-first onto the canvas.
When the world finally comes into focus, we find ourselves in a completely different
moral landscape. Up to this point, the film has revolved around a traditional win/lose
axis. Now we are in life and death territory, and it doesn’t look like there’s any escape—at
least none that would cost Frankie anything less than his soul.
The choice Miller speaks of here is the one presented to Frankie when Maggie—the female
boxer whom Frankie has been coaching and who has become a quadriplegic after an accident
in the boxing ring—asks Frankie to end her suffering. Miller goes on to paint the film as
showing the agony that one would surely feel in Frankie’s position, having to wrestle with a
moral code that condemns the taking of life and with a love that demands precisely that. But
even from this brief extract, it’s easy enough to see that Miller’s review shows a continuing
allegiance to a particular discourse of aesthetics. In it we find a typical critical distinction
made between supposedly ‘artistic’ films and supposedly ‘formulaic’ films. Eastwood is no
stranger to the accusation of ‘formula’, with reviewers charging many of his westerns (not
even discounting the sublime Unforgiven) and particularly the Dirty Harry films with being
‘formulaic’. In the above commentary, Miller verges on making a similar charge with regard
to MDB. What ‘saves’ the movie, it seems, is the (literal) sucker punch and the ensuing ‘drama’
and ‘tragedy’. As mandated by the ‘high/low’ distinction, in other words, the film’s signifi-
cance, according to Miller (though not only him), hinges on its divergence from a ‘formula’.
This kind of critical practice is, of course, not uncommon in the world of film-reviewing.
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Indeed, so much seems invested in film reviews in disparaging films for being ‘formulaic’
that any film which doesn’t display overt signs of its ‘artistic sensibility’—usually, though
not solely, via a focus on ‘character’ as distinct from plot or via the use of ‘unconventional’
film and narrative techniques—seems to be evaluated and discussed only in terms of the
extent to which it reproduces a formula or some other readily identifiable set of ‘generic
features’.15 Never mind the fact, for instance, that even apparently ‘formulaic’ films can engage
with serious issues and complex themes. Never mind the fact that not everything worth
reflecting on in this world revolves around tragedy. MDB, according to Miller, risked being
a ‘compelling but not quite innovative boxing movie’. It risked being ‘formulaic’, but then
‘right when the formula calls for a “Rocky-like” character to start shouting “Adrian! Adrian!”
with his/her eyes swollen shut and arms raised in victory, Eastwood pulls the old “one-two”
and knocks us face-first onto the canvas’.
What’s particularly notable about Miller’s account of MDB’s ‘risky’ trajectory in terms of
the Rocky-like ‘formula’ is that Rocky Balboa loses the fight in the scene from Rocky to which
Miller refers. The very film which Miller suggests is exemplary of a particular formulaic nar-
rative, in other words, does not in fact ‘follow the formula’. So, either Miller hasn’t even seen
the film he’s ready to judge as formulaic—and if this is the case, what does this say about the
prejudices bound up with our critical concepts?—or what Miller really means by ‘formula’
is ‘lack of “life-and-death” drama’. For Miller, and he’s not in the least bit alone in this respect,
what’s important about MDB is everything that happens after the sucker punch. The rest of
the film might as well not exist; the first two-thirds, at best, simply establishes the initial
situation, into which tragedy will come to intervene. But if we’re going to make the charge
of ‘formula’ here, it strikes me that it’s precisely reviewers like Miller who are following a
well-established formula. His is the formula that goes something like this: films featuring
‘life-and-death’ drama are Great Art, while films that focus on such menial things as boxing
or depict the ‘glorious rise of the underdog’ are second-rate, formulaic films. What’s especially
bothersome about this dismissal of the first two-thirds of the film at the expense of the last
third is that it’s possible to read the film’s ‘tragic’ events as being just as ‘formulaic’ or ‘pre-
dictable’ (albeit in a different way) as Miller implies Rocky to be. Almost everything about
the last third of the film—from the sucker punch (a legitimate blow makes it harder to feel
that Maggie’s injury was ‘unfair’) through the ungrateful family (a supportive family makes
Maggie’s situation easier to accept) to Frankie’s disappearance after the deed (living on in an
idealised inner turmoil, so we don’t have to see him, maybe, get over it)—seems to follow a
particular blueprint that, in the context of other, less ‘artistically’ presented and produced
films, would be hounded for its ‘lack of realism’ or for its ‘Hollywood sentimentalism’. Yet
few (if any) critics have interpreted the film’s ‘tragic’ events as anything other than central to
the film’s significance. I can’t help but wonder whether there might rather be something in
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the first two thirds of MDB that’s worthy of comment, but if so, I can barely think what it
might be for all the reviews that want to dismiss that part as irrelevant.
Of course, no one expects such ‘non-academic’ modes of cultural assessment as film review-
ing to reproduce the nuances and sophistication of a cultural studies scholar trained in post-
structuralism or the politics of popular culture. In many ways, though, that is precisely the
point—for where else should one look for signs of cultural studies’ intellectual and peda-
gogical effects, beyond the specialist contexts of academic research and critique, if not in
those non-academic practices which most closely resemble the kinds of ‘critical’ work that
are, in their more ‘scholarly’ guises (such as in the work of Adorno or Leavis), ordinarily
problematised by cultural studies’ post-structuralist and post-Marxist theories of culture?
Given the pervasive use of the internet precisely for the purpose of exchanging views
about popular cultural forms, moreover, it’s easy to see that the critical work of reviewing
is by no means confined to a handful of pages in the weekend editions of popular news-
papers. Indeed, such work is undertaken whenever the merits or meanings of cultural
texts are debated—be it by David and Margaret during a fiery episode of The Movie Show, by
the members of the Classification Board from the Office of Film and Literature Classifica-
tion,16 or by a couple of friends over a post-film cappuccino at the local cafe. Consequently,
if Miller’s review is in any way indicative of everyday practice, it’s worth pausing to consider
the extent to which reassessments of mass culture discourse have disseminated beyond the
specialist discipline of cultural studies and permeated not just the broader popular con-
sciousness but, more importantly, general popular practices. Any potential disjuncture between
‘academic’ and ‘popular’ or ‘everyday’ modes of cultural assessment, that is, should raise the
question of cultural studies’ effectiveness with regard to the critique and delimitation of pre-
vailing practices of cultural criticism. For if the forms of cultural criticism that circulate
routinely in the popular media and in other non-academic sites continue to be those forms
that owe their logic to a putatively obsolete discourse on ‘mass culture’, then to what extent
can cultural studies be said to have transformed predominant ways of thinking and talking
about popular culture?
In one sense, of course, popular views of popular culture have shifted to some degree,
though the extent to which cultural studies may be credited with that transformation remains
debatable. This is to say that the ‘unofficial’ version of the ‘high/low’ discourse as it functions
in reviewing practices is not quite identical to its ‘mass culture’ quasi-equivalent. For the
contemporary, non-academic version of that discourse seeks to distinguish not between two
different forms of cultural practice—opera versus television, for example—but rather between
different qualities as identifiable within particular examples of the same form of cultural
practice—distinguishing, that is, between particular films (say) on the basis of whether they
are ‘artistic’ or ‘formulaic’, ‘serious’ or ‘frivolous’, ‘challenging and confronting’ or ‘simplistic,
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stereotypical and predictable’, and so on. It remains the case, nevertheless, that such forms
of critique, whether in their ‘academic’ or their ‘popular’ forms, reproduce a potentially anti-
democratic sentiment, one which discounts the actual pleasures and choices of a significant
proportion of cultural ‘consumers’. Furthermore, the popular forms of the ‘high/low’ dis-
tinction reproduce the same presumptions of textual power and audience passivity that can
be found in the likes of Adorno’s and Leavis’s arguments. As Janice Radway so rightly put it
as far back as 1986:
Not only are cultural objects assumed [in prevailing conceptions of mass culture] to be fixed
and determined in advance in the sense that their meaning is given to them by their creators,
but they are thought to be determining as well. That is to say, they have the power to dictate
or control not only how they are perceived and understood by their purchasers but how
they are used. Human beings are concomitantly perceived as passive and somnolent, … [as
having] absolutely no power themselves to act on their environment, to select some objects
over others, to use them in creative ways, or to construct their significance idiosyncratically.
In effect, traditional mass-culture methodology denies the semiotic capacities and social
activities of large numbers of individuals.17
Radway’s reference to the ‘semiotic capacities and social activities of large numbers of indi-
viduals’ marks one of the founding moments in the formation of ‘the active audience’ thesis.
Ironically, however, it is precisely in the context of affirmations of audience ‘activity’ that the
‘high/low’ distinction and the mass culture view reveal their most powerful effects, thereby
providing perhaps the most compelling reason for reconsidering popular reviewing prac-
tices. For when the genre of the review is conceived not as an account of one person’s assess-
ment (on behalf of the ‘ordinary consumer’) of a given cultural text but rather as a discursive
practice ‘that systematically form[s] the objects of which [it]speaks’18 and as a disciplinary
technique that ‘produces subjected and practised bodies, “docile” bodies’,19 it becomes pos-
sible to recognise that cultural reviews not only shape the identity of the texts they assess
but also function as a kind of informal training in how to engage with or ‘interpret’ such
texts. To the extent that the ‘high/low’ distinction continues to operate unproblematised in
such reviews, therefore, the latter helps produce (as it were) ‘formulaic’, ‘frivolous’, ‘stereo-
typical’ films (i.e. by reading their significance only as ‘formulaic’ etc.) and helps train readers
to engage with films primarily in those same terms. Notwithstanding arguments regarding
the ‘interpretive power’ of ‘active’ audiences, in other words, there’s a very real sense in which
the ‘high/low’ distinction as it functions in popular reviewing practices breeds ‘docile’ audiences
—by training them to engage with popular texts in particular, very circumscribed ways.
By predetermining a given text’s lack of cultural significance, in other words, by depicting
the range of appropriate responses to such a text precisely in terms of those kinds of audience
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‘activity’ which popular texts have always been presumed to generate—‘escapism’, ‘mind-
less pleasure’, if not outright ‘moral debasement’ or ‘political manipulation’—and by thus
closing down other possible forms of engagement or interpretation, popular reviewing prac-
tices may work systematically to create passivity in the form of silence. At best, if such prac-
tices do allow or promote an alternative, ‘engaged’ form of response in audiences, that form
of ‘activity’ would seem largely to take the form of an almost slavish reproduction of the
critical prejudice itself.
Needless to say the effects of such a discursive practice are neither uniform nor guaranteed,
and it’s doubtless the case that particular segments of media audiences may engage with
cultural texts (including the reviews themselves) in ways that exceed the limits set by mass
culture. Nevertheless, if that discourse can be granted any significant regularity in its operation,
then its continued functioning in popular reviewing practices and in more general debates
about media and popular culture presents an obstacle to any attempt at reconceiving cul-
ture in more complex terms. Moreover, this obstacle emerges not simply in the context of
practices of aesthetic assessment. As Catharine Lumby has effectively shown through her dis-
cussion of a series of complaints raised about a ‘sexist’ advertisement for a watch, the discourse
regulating reviews of popular culture may take a political guise too.20 In her analysis—which
has since been summarised by Alan McKee in his account of cultural studies’ available methods
of textual analysis (the significance of which point will become apparent shortly)21—Lumby
reproduces the print advertisement, run by a Sydney jeweller, and then recounts the series
of highly critical responses it prompted from the reading public (and even from federal poli-
ticians) when published in a major Australian magazine. The advertisement, as McKee sub-
sequently describes it, ‘shows a woman wearing a flimsy satin dress. A man is standing behind
her, his hand reaching down inside to fondle her; she is reading a book, and reaching down
between her legs at the same time.’22 The ensuing responses, which Lumby reviews in detail,
denounced the advertisement as ‘blatantly sexist’,23 criticising particularly the advertise-
ment’s patriarchal ‘objectification’ of women, as can be seen in the following complaint
submitted to the Australian Advertising Standards Council:
It is the most offensive advertisement I have ever been subjected to. It conveys the danger-
ously misleading message that women condone and enjoy being molested by men and that
this behaviour is completely normal. It objectifies women, demeans women and advocates
sexual harassment and abuse, which is absolutely unacceptable. I am disgusted by this
advertisement and feel that printing it is yet another crime against women.24
As Lumby notes, ‘anybody who reads newspapers, watches television or listens to the
radio will recognise this critique as feminist’.25 To that extent, arguments or analyses such
as the above amount to a kind of popular ‘political’ criticism of popular culture. From one
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point of view, this kind of criticism aims to undermine the patriarchal oppression of women
by challenging representations of women that perpetuate gender stereotypes or express sexist
views of women as ‘sex objects’. By the same token, such complaints about the dangerous
‘message’ conveyed by the jewellery advertisement (or by ‘sexist representations’ more
generally) are premised on precisely the assumptions about textual power and audience pas-
sivity that inform the supposedly superseded ‘mass culture’ view of popular culture. As with
the aesthetic form of the ‘high/low’ distinction, in other words, a particular view of the ‘oppres-
sive’ or ‘negative’ effects of popular culture which is largely attributable to the assumptions
underpinning an ‘outdated’ academic discourse can be seen as maintaining significant currency
in contemporary public discussions of popular culture.
What bothers Lumby about the complaints she discusses is partly the way that the kind
of ‘feminism’ they articulate happily lends its social and rhetorical power to campaigns for
censorship mounted by ‘the kind of social conservatives who want to abolish abortion, criminal-
ise homosexuality and dismantle feminism’.26 As McKee observes, moreover, the complainants’
enabling assumption of ‘patriarchy’ ‘as an all-powerful and ultimately inescapable force …
renders it very difficult to imagine representations of women that would be acceptable to a
rigorous feminist analysis’.27 To that extent, the continued allegiance to the conception of
popular culture which informs that ‘critical’ discourse has the effect of disempowering
entire communities (in more ways than one) precisely at the moment it aims to spur the most
vocal criticism in the name of those communities. Against this view of the deleterious effects
of ‘sexist’ images, then, Lumby insists that ‘reading images is never simple’ and that images
are ‘affected by what frames them’.28 Working from such a position Lumby proposes a counter-
reading of the jeweller’s advertisement, one which focuses on the depicted woman’s con-
trol over and self-pleasure in the ‘sexist’ act being depicted: ‘for one thing, the woman is
reading a book—an activity she doesn’t seem eager to hurl aside just because hubby’s
home from the office. For another, she’s touching herself—behaviour which suggests there’s
a little more to their sexual relationship than penetration’.29 Notwithstanding arguments that
the advertisement depicts ‘women’ as ‘objects … entirely at the disposal of men’,30 therefore,
Lumby focuses on the image’s depiction of female sexual activity and thereby appropriates
it for the purpose of thinking about the complexities of sexual politics.
While Lumby’s point about reading images is hardly unprecedented in cultural studies
(not even at the time that she writes), it leads her to ask a series of questions that are extremely
important for my attempt to think about cultural studies and practices of cultural criticism:
Why insist on reading images like the Sydney jeweller’s ad as demeaning to women? Why
teach women to read images in a way that makes them feel embarrassed about them-
selves? Why not encourage them to make creative readings of images and to appropriate
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and reinvent female stereotypes to their own advantage? Continually stressing the patriarchal
reading of an image which can be read in other ways is hardly empowering for women. In
fact, it’s a strategy which cedes an awesome power to images and to the people who produce
them and which denies the ability women demonstrate daily to use imagination, critical
resistance and humour in negotiating images and life in general.31
Lumby’s questions shouldn’t be taken as an excuse to ignore or otherwise deny the role of
advertising and commercial media industries (though not only those industries) in generat-
ing and seeking to profit from a particular economy of sexuality. Undoubtedly, there’s much
to be reflected on and challenged with regard to the contemporary dynamics and flows of
visibility, desire, power and capital, for instance, which have made ‘representing’ the female
body a particularly lucrative business for some. And certainly cultural studies’ research into
the politics of culture, having largely moved on from the representationalist paradigm which
informs Lumby’s complainants, is in a much better position to analyse such dynamics and
flows in ways that are more nuanced, self-reflexive and finely-tuned to plays of difference than
has been the case in the discipline’s early years. But what strikes me as particularly interest-
ing about Lumby’s questions is the way they invite us to reflect on the role that cultural studies
pedagogy may play in reproducing or transforming the particular modes of ‘critique’ and
‘interpretation’ that are available to ‘popular’ or ‘non-academic’ forms of cultural criticism—
to those forms of cultural criticism, in other words, that are regularly practiced in public
debates about culture. Specifically, Lumby’s questions are couched in terms which bring into
focus a material point of connection between a set of concepts and practices of interpretation
and a particular practice of disseminating those concepts and practices: ‘why teach women
to read images in a way that makes them feel embarrassed about themselves?’.
Rather than presuming that audiences are always capable of appropriating cultural texts
in ‘resistant’ ways, in other words, Lumby’s questions hint at the way in which a particular
critical discourse—in her case, an institutionalised form of ‘feminism’—functions so as to
regulate and mobilise the kinds of responses audiences routinely display. Furthermore, implicit
in her suggestion that audiences may be ‘encouraged’ to ‘make creative readings of images’
and to ‘reinvent female stereotypes to their own advantage’ is an understanding of audience
activity not as a capacity that is either innate or uniformly distributed among media audiences
but rather as a potential to be cultivated in such audiences by a more or less formal pedagogy.
Beyond merely demonstrating (be it theoretically or empirically) the present ‘semiotic capacities’
of media audiences, cultural studies’ relation to audience activity would, on this account,
take the form of disseminating skills for conducting critical-creative responses to and
readings of cultural texts.
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Pedagogy and the question of interpretation
If it appears that cultural studies has for many years been participating in precisely such
processes of cultivation—by reconceiving its pedagogical objectives in terms of cultivating
cultural and critical literacies, for instance—and has done so partly for the purpose of trans-
forming conventional understandings of culture and politics, I want to suggest that this may
not be the case. Certainly, given both Hartley’s and Hunter’s accounts of the institutional
limits to the effectivity of cultural studies, the apparent success of cultural studies in breaking
with its earlier assumptions about the divisions of culture warrants further thought at
least. With Hartley, that is, I suspect that a certain ‘critical commonsense’ and the ‘lines of
demarcation’ it reproduces in cultural studies’ pedagogy is partly responsible—largely through
the way that different disciplines operate ‘to dictate the primacy of certain questions’32—for
the continuing influence of or allegiance to a putatively ‘outdated’ view of popular culture.
The constraints of space prevent me from providing much more than the vaguest gestures
towards delineating the institutional, pedagogical divisions that beget and reproduce this
‘commonsense’. Such divisions would include the ongoing critical distribution of popular
texts via the language of genre—notwithstanding the lip service paid to arguments that genres
are impure, non-determining, impossible to delimit and define, and so on.33 They would
also include (after Hartley) the disciplinary divisions between ‘the aesthetic disciplines (Film
and Literary Studies)’ and a more ‘materialist’ form of cultural studies, as well as the con-
comitant (albeit not quite isomorphic) distinction between cultural texts and their indus-
trial contexts.34 Although the emergence of ‘postmodernism’ and the reinvention of cultural
studies throughout the 1990s would suggest that these divisions no longer structure the
analysis of popular culture according to the evaluative (not to mention dismissive) positions
represented by Adorno and Leavis, my suspicion is that the so-called acceptance of popular
culture as a legitimate field of study represents merely a transformation of certain critical
prejudices into the apparently ‘neutral’ techniques or imperatives of a discipline.
For instance, would it be conceived as utterly essential that industrial systems of mass pro-
duction and distribution be discussed in a unit of study on feminist literature? Would it be
required that the reading of Modernist literature be discussed first and foremost in terms of
‘consumption’? Would it be suggested that the only way to identify different readings of
Romantic poetry is to examine the historically and geographically dispersed readings pro-
duced by concretely situated readers? Would a textbook on postcolonial literature be required
to depict the texts it discusses as displaying a set of generic features authorised by the his-
torical development of a tradition and reproduced in each new instance of that tradition?
If the answer to all these questions is not an emphatic ‘yes’, then why is it seemingly imperative
that such approaches and terminology be adopted when it comes to studying popular media
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texts? Undoubtedly, the extent to which such approaches and terminology still appear as
‘radical’ or ‘unconventional’—or at the very least as ‘optional’—in the context of literary studies
indicates just how much that discipline, even after ‘the post-structuralist turn’ and notwith-
standing the laudable efforts of literary theorists, remains organised according a particular
logic of culture. By the same token, the extent to which it is still rare for the study of popular
texts to be organised around the objective of exploring and generating creative or strategic
readings of such texts—the kinds of creative interpretations, for instance, which literary
studies regularly attempts with regard to ‘proper’ literary texts—is extremely suggestive of
how much cultural studies has internalised and sublimated the critical prejudices which
define its pasts.
The point can be made by briefly considering the way in which the question of inter-
pretation is presented within cultural studies pedagogy, particularly via the pedagogical force
of introductory texts on the study of popular culture. Such texts provide at best an equivocal
measure of the way in which the study of popular culture remains delimited by something
like a critical commonsense—not least of all because they are shaped (partly) by the con-
servative force of academic publishing and its associated logics of profit and accessibility,
and since they may in any case be integrated and used within specific university units in
ways that aren’t reducible to the pedagogical rationale they articulate. However, insofar as
the machinery of academic publishing is plugged into academic and pedagogical frameworks
(via academic authors themselves, market research, peer-reviewing of book proposals and
manuscripts, etc.) and as textbook-assisted teaching remains relatively commonplace in uni-
versity education, introductory accounts of the study of popular culture not only present a
limited gauge of how the positivity of the field is constituted on the basis of an array of
disciplinary divisions but also factor in as a material conduit for the reproduction of such
divisions and their concordant delimitation of pedagogical practice.
For instance, such introductory accounts routinely present cultural studies’ general
turn to ‘the reader’ and its raising of the question of interpretation in two dominant ways.
The first of these takes the form of the ‘ethnographic’ challenge to the idea, presumed by earlier
mass culture methodology, that texts are fixed in their meaning and determining of the
way they are interpreted and used.35 This way of introducing the question of interpretation
regularly cites David Morley’s and Ien Ang’s well-known work on television audiences and
Janice Radway’s study of romance fiction readers as demonstrating that interpretations made
by ‘actual’ audience members and readers not only differ from interpretations generated
by mass culture frameworks but also vary significantly across studied populations. From
these studies emerged, on this account, a theoretical imperative to develop and refine con-
cepts of ‘audience activity’ and a methodological imperative to acknowledge and demon-
strate the plurality of possible interpretations of media texts. While the latter imperative was
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mostly answered by a new generation of audience researchers, McKee’s overview of textual
analysis methodology explains how this ‘turn’ to the reader led to the development of ‘an
important new approach to textual analysis’.36 McKee initially attributes the emergence of
this ‘new approach’ to Bennett and Woollacott’s famous study of James Bond novels in terms
of ‘reading formations’, and he goes on to describe this approach as ‘one which did not attempt
to work out the single correct interpretation of a text, but which looked at context in order
to work out likely interpretations (of which there could easily be more than one)’.37 And
as an update to earlier accounts of this history of methodology, McKee goes on to situate
Lumby’s argument about reading images as an example of this ‘new approach’.
In positioning Lumby’s analysis as an example of ‘work[ing] out likely interpretations’,
however, McKee ends up reducing the range of approaches to textual analysis by down-
playing the creative work involved in that analysis. This is to say that there is a sense in which
Lumby’s reading of the jewellery advertisement isn’t a ‘likely’ one at all—especially consider-
ing the discursive power of that form of feminism which animates and legitimates a blanket
charge of sexism. Rather than presenting a likely interpretation of the text in question, then,
Lumby, drawing on a (still) fairly esoteric set of ideas about sexuality, power and represen-
tation, actually composes a counter-reading of that text. Lumby doesn’t so much ‘analyse’
the text, in other words, as ‘create’ it, giving it alternative significance by way of a particular
reading framework which hopes to approach culture as an ethico-political question. And to
the extent that her creative reading might seem more sensible (or at least more sensitive to
the possibility of alternative interpretations) than the dogmatically ‘feminist’ readings she
seeks to defuse, Lumby’s counter-interpretation helps to show up the fact that these latter
readings are creations of sorts too. ‘Likely’ interpretations, in other words—and even textual
‘analyses’ which seek to work out likely interpretations—are always more or less compositions
or creations: products of particular sets of reading techniques and protocols as they are
activated in relation to given texts (and inter-texts) within specific interpretive events. Such
‘interpretations’ are undoubtedly regulated in various ways—by the continuing functioning
of the ‘high/low’ discourse or by the protocols of a particular critical discipline, for example—
which thus reduces their potential plurality, but the force of such reading conventions is far
from complete or uniform.
McKee’s emphasis on ‘likely’ interpretations is a gesture perhaps made with the aim of
maintaining contact with the ethnographic privileging of ‘actual’ audience responses or, pos-
sibly, with the sociological focus on regularities or rituals framing consumption. In any case,
McKee is by no means alone in foregrounding the task of analysing existing (or likely) inter-
pretations over the possibility of creating interpretations—or of creating, more to the point,
counter-interpretations.38 Nor, of course (in case this needs to be said), is he or any other
author of introductory texts to be ‘criticised’ for recounting a widely accepted view of textual
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analysis. But in the context of questions about cultural studies’ success in transforming pre-
vailing conceptions of culture, and hence about attempts to focus cultural studies pedagogy
on the development of critical literacies, this particular way of accounting for ‘the reader’ in
the analysis of popular culture can be seen as problematic, if not counter-productive. For
it reproduces a particularly pervasive division of culture—between cultural criticism and
cultural production—one which continues to delimit rather than expand the range of pos-
sible responses to and uses of cultural texts. To put it simply: being able to recognise, explain
or argue that texts can be interpreted in multiple, even unexpected ways is not the same as
being able to produce multiple, even unexpected interpretations. Nor is possession of a capacity
to do the former a guarantee or sign of the ability to do the latter.
In contrast to accounts of the ethnographic challenge and the focus on likely readings,
the practice of interpretation-as-creation is engaged in a second way of introducing inter-
pretation within cultural studies pedagogy. This form of engaging ‘the reader’ entails intro-
ducing students to different theories of textuality and interpretation, drawn largely from the
‘traditions’ of hermeneutics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, post-structuralism, and so on. Tellingly,
such theories tend to be introduced as such in ‘the aesthetic disciplines’ (literary and film
studies) rather than in cultural studies ‘proper’—on account, most probably, of the histori-
cal centrality of forms of aesthetic (or reflective) judgement within the former as against the
forms of political (or determining) judgement which have shaped the latter.39 Without much
regard to their largely philosophical origins, the ideas extracted from these traditions are
regularly presented as theories of interpretation—as resources for ‘reading’ or for ‘making
sense’ of cultural texts in different ways. Accordingly, such theories are regularly approached
in terms both of their ‘content’ (ideas about texts and interpretation) and of their delineation
of ‘technique’ (a practical method for interpreting texts). To that extent, this pedagogical
form of raising the question of interpretation not only emphasises the role of the student-as-
reader in the ‘production of meaning’, thereby demonstrating the plurality of possible inter-
pretations of cultural texts, but also provides a context for developing skills in creative
interpretation through the ‘application’ of different theories to particular texts.
By the same token, the extent to which these interpretive exercises are regularly tied to
the disciplinary contexts of literature and film (and thus to the specific procedures and
logics privileged in each of those contexts) inevitably reduces their immediate applicability
for the purpose of pursuing creative criticism of popular narrative. This is the case not because
these theories are ‘vulgarised’ in their translation from philosophy to film and literary
studies and then to the study of popular culture, but rather because the ‘interpretation’ of
popular texts—even in its specialised or apparently value-neutral form—continues to be
materially organised according to a logic which is significantly distinct from the logics of
literary and film aesthetics—to a logic, that is, whose locus is the theories and methodologies
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of the ‘mass culture’ tradition. While contemporary literary theory has thoroughly compli-
cated the traditional conceptions of authorship, literary meaning, interpretation, writing,
spirit, tradition and so forth, which together form the logic of an earlier discipline of literary
studies, such theories are rarely directed—in pedagogical contexts, at least—at the specific
constellation of concepts which have historically defined the analysis and evaluation of popular
art. In popular reviewing practices, these concepts tend to be evaluative and organised
diametrically: innovation v. formula, aestheticism v. commercialism, realism v. escapism, art
v. entertainment, and so on. Consequently, exercises in literary theory often have little
purchase on practices of assessing popular culture, since the latter are rarely organised accord-
ing to the literary logic that the former engages. To the extent that such practices do activate
a logic of ‘art’—say, when a particular film is reviewed as ‘innovative’ and ‘challenging’—the
effect of such a practice is to remove the text from the general category of (formulaic, com-
mercial, escapist) popular narrative rather than to trouble the ‘high/low’ distinction as such.
Seemingly by contrast, contemporary cultural studies prefers to adopt a more descriptive,
non-aesthetic logic of popular culture, speaking of genre as a reading formation, of indus-
trial contexts of production and reception, of the contradictory and resistant pleasures of
consumption, of variable social uses of popular texts, and so on. But insofar as that logic
marginalises questions of aesthetics, it too (at best) fails to connect with popular reviewing
practices, or (at worst) actually confirms the logic of mass culture by way of its reduction of
the question of culture to a matter of sociological analysis.40
Cultural studies has, to be sure—and ought to have—many uses, many forms, many objec-
tives, many techniques, and not all of these need be oriented towards some overriding
goal of transformation. But cultural studies’ relative disconnection from popular reviewing
practices may be disconcerting for any cultural studies program that is concerned with trans-
forming widespread conceptions of culture. Notwithstanding cultural studies’ advances from
the positions on popular culture held by Adorno and Leavis, the mass culture prejudices and
‘high/low’ distinction would appear to have significant currency outside the specialist prac-
tices of cultural studies research. One response to this problem might be to follow Lumby’s
example by aiming to enhance audiences’ and readers’ abilities to ‘appropriate and reinvent’
popular texts in ways that are empowering and sensitive to the range of possible uses, inter-
pretations and pleasures people may take from such texts. In this respect, the pedagogical
objective of cultivating critical and cultural literacies would appear to present a strategy
for undertaking a limited displacement of the ideas about popular culture that circulate
throughout a broader public sphere. To increase its effectivity to the greatest extent possible,
however, a cultural studies pedagogy premised on such a rationale may need to be organised
around the development of strategies for interpreting popular culture against the logic of
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mass culture. Indeed, and at the risk of appearing overly mechanistic, such a pedagogy may
need to engage with and transform not just the apparently dated theories and methodologies
of mass culture but also the received ideas and embodied techniques of ‘interpretation’ which
define or constitute the popular art of reviewing popular art.
Such a strategy can’t be reduced simply to a populist affirmation of popular culture. Rather,
it would entail the dissemination of skills for conducting critical-creative readings of and
responses to popular texts, skills which may be distinguishable from the more specialised
sets of analytical skills that are privileged in current approaches in cultural studies to the
question of interpretation. While it is possible that the dissemination of such skills already
takes place in ad-hoc ways in otherwise disconnected pedagogical contexts, there seems to
have been little attempt to organise or reflect on such practices as part of a formal pedagogy,
and no real attempt to consider the ways in which the particular question of the popular may
necessitate a specific set of exercises, distinguishable from those which tend to be advanced
in the form of ‘literary theory’, to develop such skills. Pursuing the cultivation of such skills
doesn’t mean that the teaching of popular culture must be reduced to a narrowly ‘textualist’
approach to the study of popular narratives. After the ‘post-structuralist turn’ and cultural
studies’ ongoing theorisation of the politics of consumption, such a ‘return’ to an unproblem-
atised aesthetics would make little sense in the context of most cultural studies programs
today. On the contrary, the move to legitimise the study of popular culture in terms of creative
criticism is a step towards finding new ways of linking the kinds of observations able to be
drawn from critical political economy (for example) to the ‘lived practice’ of reading or other-
wise engaging with popular texts. Exploring the possible insights that the disciplines of creative
criticism may offer to the popular art of reviewing popular art, in other words, may enable
the study of popular culture to more effectively introduce its critical theories of cultural con-
sumption and to connect them to popular practices in a more meaningful, critical way.
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